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Abstract
What are the origins and consequences of the state as a provider of public goods? We
study public goods provision established through new laws in German cities during
the 1500s. Cities that adopted the laws subsequently began to differentially produce
and attract human capital and to grow faster. Legal change occurred where ideological
competition introduced by the Protestant Reformation interacted with local politics.
We study plagues that shifted local politics in a narrow period as sources of exogenous
variation in public goods institutions, and find support for a causal interpretation of
the relationship between legal change, human capital, and growth.
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1 Introduction
For much of history states have provided minimal public goods and have instead served
the objectives of elites (Tilly 1975; 1985; North 1990). A significant literature suggests
that military conflict has provided one path to the provision of public goods, with states
developing to provide defense (Besley and Persson 2011; Dincecco and Prado 2012; Gennaioli
and Voth 2015). However, states today provide of broad set of public goods, including
education, insurance, and health care. What are the origins and impacts of the state as a
provider of non-defense public goods? And what do the short- and the long-run impacts
indicate about how public goods provision may become a stable equilibrium?
In this paper we study the transition from a low public goods equilibrium to a high
public goods equilibrium, using evidence on historic German cities. In the 1500s, some
cities adopted laws that led to greater public goods provision. These laws expanded welfare
provision, set up public education, and made secular city governments responsible for
provision. The aim of education was largely political: schooling was designed to produce
administrators to ensure the efficient provision of services and the stability of high public
goods provision as an equilibrium.1 The laws that formalized these changes were called
church ordinances (Kirchenordnungen). We refer to these laws as “public goods” institutions,
as distinct from economic institutions securing property rights or political institutions
governing the selection of rulers.2
Shocks to religious and political competition drove the adoption of public goods
institutions. The introduction of religious competition during the Protestant Reformation
was a global shock to politics in central Europe. The collapse of the ideological monopoly
of the Catholic Church created an opening for political entrepreneurs, who criticized
the Catholic Church as a rent-seeking organization. These entrepreneurs developed the
innovations in local public goods institutions that we study. The adoption of these
1Strauss (1988; p. 202) observes that, “little encouragement was given in the pupil’s formal education
to individual Bible reading. Most school plans make no mention of it at all.” While Bible reading was not
central, ideological persuasion was a key aim, as in contemporary settings (e.g. Cantoni et al. 2017).
2Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005a) highlight the importance of economic institutions that
facilitate factor accumulation. The institutions we study directly promoted the accumulation of human
capital and may have indirectly promoted property rights through their influence on the quality of
administration (North 1990; Gonzalez de Lara, Greif, and Jha 2008). The institutions we study expanded
the provision of pure public goods and services which are arguably quasi-public or even private goods, such
as education. We use “public goods” as broad label.
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institutions reflected local politics, and was driven by popular political movements, not
by local elites (Cameron 1991).3 Local shocks that lowered the relative price of political
action by citizens interacted with the global shock of the Reformation.
We describe the new public goods institutions, document shocks that generated variation
in which cities adopted, and trace the consequences for human capital and growth. These
changes occurred in only some Protestant cities. We find that public goods institutions, and
not the adoption of Protestantism, explain economic development.
We focus our investigation on the mechanism leading from the adoption of church
ordinances to long-run growth. Adoption marked a change in the political and institutional
equilibrium. This change was secured by a shift in the formation and allocation of human
capital towards public goods provision targeting education and welfare, and an increase
in the quality of local administration. In the long run, adoption had unintended positive
consequences for human capital in the business sector and city growth.
We also investigate the political mechanism that led to the adoption of church ordinances.
The Reformation lowered the relative price of political action globally by introducing
competition in the market for religion. However, political change remained costly. In the
early 1500s, local plagues interacted with the global effects of religious competition. Plagues
weakened incumbent elites and increased demand for public goods institutions. We use
plague shocks as a source of exogenous variation in the adoption of church ordinances.
Our analysis generates specific predictions about the consequences of adopting church
ordinances.4 First, the formation and the migration of upper tail human capital are expected
to respond to ordinances. Second, we expect short-term increases in human capital to be
in targeted sectors: public administration, education, and the reformed church. Third, we
expect that improvements in administration and public goods will generate human capital
spillovers to other sectors, including the business sector. Fourth, we expect that these direct
and indirect effects will lead to city growth. Fifth, we predict that these effects are driven by
local variation in adoption, not the informal diffusion of Protestantism or regional factors.
Our analysis also generates specific predictions about the political process leading to
3These movements developed without the initial support from economic elites, city councils, or territorial
rulers (Dickens 1982; Scribner 1979; Schilling 1983). We provide detail below.
4When we discuss the impact of church ordinances, we refer not simply to the legal documents but to
the new political and institutional equilibrium they represent. The ordinances are indicators of the change
in the political equilibrium towards public goods, which was reinforced by education.
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the adoption of ordinances, including the role of the plague. First, we expect religious and
political competition to be higher in cities that adopted and where plagues struck in the early
1500s. Second, we expect local plague shocks to predict adoption, even within territories and
principalities. Third, we expect plagues in the early 1500s to have a unique relationship with
long-run growth, due to the political implications of plagues following the global introduction
of religious competition. This prediction corresponds to a test of the exclusion restriction
when we use plague as an instrumental variable.
To test our predictions about the consequences of adoption for human capital and
growth, we assemble data on city-level church ordinances, upper tail human capital, and
city populations. We collect information on cities with church ordinances from Sehling
(1902-2016). We construct microdata on upper tail human capital between 1420 and 1820
from the Deutsche Biographie, which is the definitive biographical dictionary of economic,
cultural, and political figures in Germany (Hockerts 2008). We use data on city population
from Bairoch, Batou, and Che`vre (1988).
In the data, we show that upper tail human capital increased in response to the adoption
of church ordinances, as predicted. The initial response was in the public goods sectors
targeted by the church ordinances: administration, education, and religion. Consistent with
our predictions, we document that positive human capital spillovers into the business sector
emerged with a lag. Finally, we show that adoption increased long-run city growth.
We use a difference-in-differences identification strategy to document the causal impact of
the adoption of ordinances on upper tail human capital. We further show that the immediate
increases in upper tail human capital were in targeted sectors, and that positive spillovers
into the business sector emerged with a lag. We examine both the migration and the local
formation of human capital. We find similar results, but that migration responses were more
immediate, reflecting the manner in which upper tail administrators and educators moved
to cities with ordinances to help establish the new political equilibrium. These responses
hold controlling for whether or not a city adopted Protestantism; when we compare cities in
the same region; and thus when we account for potential spatial variation in the diffusion
of Protestantism similar to Becker and Woessmann (2009). This evidence is consistent with
our prediction concerning the role of local factors and distinguishes our results from prior
research. The effects we document hold controlling for underlying city-specific trends and
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persist through later shocks such as the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). Our results thus
indicate that the new equilibrium promoted economic opportunity and mobility.5
To study the growth effects of public goods institutions, we examine two long-run
outcomes: population and human capital intensity. We show that cities that adopted church
ordinances grew significantly larger and more human capital intensive by 1800.6 To address
questions about potentially selective adoption, we use plague outbreaks in the early 1500s
as an instrumental variable (IV). We find large effects of public goods institutions studying
variation in adoption induced by the quasi-experimental short-run variation in plague.
To test our predictions about the political process that led to adoption, we examine data
on plagues, religious and political publications, and church ordinances. We use publication
data to measure ideological competition. Political and religious competition increased where
plagues struck in the early 1500s, and where ordinances were subsequently adopted, as
predicted. Cities hit by plagues were more likely to adopt ordinances, even conditional on
underlying plague trends. We show that plagues in the early 1500s have a unique relationship
with long-run growth, supporting the exclusion restriction and reflecting how plagues in the
Reformation era shifted the relative price of political action. We also show that plague shocks
varied locally, hitting only some cities in a region, and that there were no trends in plagues
overall or towards cities with trade network advantages. We provide historical evidence on
how the plague shifted the relative price of political action in the early 1500s.
We present panel estimates that support our cross-sectional IV analysis of long-run city
population outcomes. We show that the adoption of ordinances explains which towns became
cities with population records and that the probability that city population is in the upper
end of the distribution.
Our research contributes to the literature on the historic development of public goods
provision.7 Prior research has emphasized two political processes that drove increases in
5Opportunity and mobility may have been promoted through several channels. For example, by creating
a more educated workforce, expanding opportunity for talented individuals from modest backgrounds, or
limiting corruption and ensuring high quality administration of economic institutions regulating production,
exchange, and property rights.
6We study long-run outcomes cross sectionally because city population is not consistently observed before
the adoption of ordinances for many cities, limiting our ability to study growth in the panel as we discuss
below. Around 1800, institutional changes and educational reforms impacted economic development in
German cities (Strauss 1978; Acemoglu et al. 2011). We thus focus on city growth up to 1800.
7On contemporary public goods, see e.g. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and Martinez-Bravo et al. (2014).
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the provision of public goods: (1) extensions of democratic voting rights and (2) military
competition between states.8 The expansion of democratic voting rights has been tied to
the growth of social spending at the national level starting in 1700s and 1800s (e.g. Lindert
2004). Prior research has also studied how military competition led to the introduction of
mass public education starting in the 1800s (Aghion, Persson, and Rouzet 2012) and to the
development of larger bureaucracies, tax authorities, and “state capacity” at the national
level (Gennaioli and Voth 2015; Dincecco and Katz 2016; Dincecco and Prado 2012). Our
research differs on two key dimensions. First, we study a different political process. We
investigate how the collapse of the ideological monopoly of the Catholic Church shifted
politics globally, and how this global shift interacted with local shocks to lower the relative
price of political action. This process was not driven by military competition or by changes
in voting rights. Second, our research documents the central role of human capital in the
expansion of public goods provision. Political change drove responses in human capital
formation, but human capital was itself allocated as a key input into sustaining a government
that provides public goods.9 In addition, we study pioneering changes in city-level public
goods provision that provided models for provision at the national level.10
Previous research ties upper tail human capital to growth in history, focusing on human
capital in science and business and taking the distribution of human capital as given (Mokyr
2009; Meisenzahl and Mokyr 2012; Squicciarini and Voigtla¨nder 2015).11 We advance the
literature by studying political changes designed to produce an administrative elite. The
immediate objectives were largely political: as Strauss (1988; p. 203) observes, “Preparing
pupils for high office was always the salient objective.” We show that political change first
8Competition among cities aiming to attract foreign merchants shaped public goods provision in other
settings (Gelderblom 2013). The political process we study was not driven by competition over merchants,
and acted on different margins from those Gelderblom (2013) examines, as discussed below.
9Our findings relate to Gonzalez de Lara, Greif, and Jha (2008) on self-reinforcing constitutions, and
Greif and Iyigun’s (2013) argument tying social insurance to reduced conflict and increased innovation.
10Hamm (1994) documents that change in public goods institutions in German cities provided models
for, and influenced, later territory-level institutional changes, notably in education. Ju¨tte (1994; p. 108)
observes that city-level changes in welfare provision in the 1500s also, “paved the way for the development
of a new social policy that favored secular systems of poor relief,” and that their legacy was, “still visible
when German towns embarked on another major reform of poor law at the end of the eighteenth century.”
11An exception closer to our study is Cantoni and Yuchtman (2014), who study the impact of exogenous
university foundation on local market institutions (market rights) across German towns during late 1300s.
Cinnirella and Streb (2017) and Maloney and Valencia Caicedo (2017) examine upper tail human capital
during the industrial revolution, and Serafinelli and Tabellini (2017) study clusters of creative human capital
through European history.
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led to increases in upper tail human capital in occupations supporting the provision of public
goods, and later to increases in business. Narrative evidence documents that the quality of
administrators rose, the beliefs of elites shifted, and innovations in monitoring worked to
ensure a relatively efficient provision.12 The sequence of changes we investigate indicates
that human capital allocated to public goods provision had positive spillovers on growth.
Our study also relates to the literature on Protestantism and economic development.13
Weber (1904) famously argued that Protestantism influenced development through its impact
on norms and preferences, especially relating to saving and work. Becker and Woessmann
(2009) argue that Protestantism fostered literacy, and that regional differences in literacy
induced by religion led to differences in development during the industrial revolution. Rubin
(2017) argues that Reformation influenced growth by reducing the power of religious elites,
and focuses on shifts in religion and political economy at the country level. In contrast
with Becker and Woessmann (2009), we study public goods institutions and their effect
on upper tail human capital and pre-industrial growth, emphasizing differences across
Protestant cities in the same regions.14 Unlike Rubin (2017), we study changes in the
political and institutional equilibrium at the city-level, where political pressure from below
drove expansions in the provision of public goods. We find that local changes in public
goods institutions drove differences in long-run growth, highlighting the importance of the
interaction between religious competition and local political economy.15
Our contribution can also be situated relative to the literature on institutions and growth.
Institutions that constrain executive authority and protect property rights contribute to
development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005a; 2001; North and Weingast 1989).
We document the positive growth impact of political and institutional changes that promoted
non-defense public goods and human capital formation.16
12See Hammond (2011), Strauss (1978), and Whaley (2012). We thus also contribute to research on the
allocation of talent (e.g. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991). In related research, Rauch and Evans (2000)
find that meritocratic recruitment of government bureaucrats lowers country risk in contemporary settings.
13For a general review of Protestantism and development, see Becker, Pfaff, and Rubin (2016).
14Our results support Cantoni’s (2015) finding that the adoption of Protestantism did not shift city growth.
15In complementary research, Cantoni, Dittmar, and Yuchtman (2018) find that Protestant princes, who
were insulated from political pressure from below, reallocated resources to the construction of administrative
buildings and palaces, but did not foster the construction of schools and hospitals. As Whaley (2012; p.
264) observes, Protestant princes appropriated monastic wealth and were “reluctant to part with it.”
16We also present the first research to document the causal impact of institutions supporting local public
goods on outcomes in targeted municipalities, to the best of our knowledge. Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and
Robinson (2015) study the spillover impacts of state capacity on outcomes across localities in Colombia.
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2 The Expansion of Public Goods Provision
In this section we first describe the legal changes that expanded public goods provision at
the city level. We then describe the political process that led to the adoption of public goods
institutions, including the role of plague outbreaks as shocks to local politics.
2.1 Legal Institutions Supporting Public Goods
We study the passage and role of municipal laws that expanded government provision of
public goods. We use the adoption of a city-level “church ordinance” law (Kirchenordnungen)
in the early 1500s as our measure of “public goods institutions.” These laws contained
interlocking requirements that (1) expanded the set of services provided by the state, (2)
transferred control of existing service provision from the Catholic Church to secular state
authorities, and (3) institutionalized anti-corruption and oversight rules to improve quality
and prevent the misappropriation of public and church finances (Strauss 1978).17 These laws
expanded the role of the secular state (Strauss 1988; Ju¨tte 1994). Hamm (1994; p. 196)
observes that the legal jurisdiction over public goods changed and that secular magistrates
took control of “institutions that particularly concerned the laity,” including schools, poor-
houses, and hospitals.
The public goods institutions were designed to establish a new social order through their
interlocking provisions. The ordinances contained provisions relating to education, social
welfare, public morality, anti-corruption safeguards, as well as religion itself. Significantly,
reformers targeted upper tail human capital in public administration as an input that would
sustain the new political equilibrium and a government that provides public goods.
First, church ordinances established public education systems. Education was designed
to produce secular administrators and churchmen, to ensure the efficient delivery of services
and the persistence of the new equilibrium, consistent with Luther’s demand for “men to
govern” in his pamphlet To the City Councillors (1524). The laws “placed the supervision of
all educational institutions firmly in the hands of. . .magistrates” (Strauss 1988; p. 193). In
a 1528 church ordinance, Philip Melanchthon underlined that the institutions were designed,
17We examine variation in these legal institutions that coincided with changes in religious practices that
were broadly shared across Protestant cities, including those that did not adopt institutional change in the
1500s, as discussed below.
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“for raising up people who are skilled to teach in the church and govern in the world”(Strauss
1988; p. 196).18 Institutions were also designed to support the migration of human capital,
including the recruitment of talented schoolchildren: “Officials roamed the land looking
for ‘good minds’ in town and village schools” (Strauss 1978; p. 178).19 Schooling was
compulsory, free for the poor, and promoted economic mobility.20
Second, the laws institutionalized social welfare provision. Municipal health care and
poor relief featured prominently, reflecting Protestant views about the role of the state in
the mitigation of suffering (Grell 2002).21 “With the Reformation. . .medical care became a
central ingredient of poor relief at least in cities . . . Assistance might involve arrangements
for a person to be admitted to a hospital, or for free medical care from physicians, surgeons,
apothecaries, or midwives” (Lindemann 2010; p. 230). Welfare provision was combined with
investigations of households to limit moral hazard (Ju¨tte 1994; Kahl 2005; Hammond 2011).
Third, the laws include provisions regulating public morality. These provisions aimed to
promote social order. They forbid gambling, drunkenness, prostitution, and similar offenses.
Fourth, anti-corruption provisions aimed to ensure the efficient allocation of public
resources and political support. To reduce corruption, the laws instituted inspections
(“visitations”) of schools, including to audit teacher attendance, and introduced an audited
“common chest” lock-box to ensure public and church finances were not misappropriated.22
These provisions led to increases in both financial and human resources devoted to public
goods provision, and represent a major instance of the rise of fiscal capacity.
The adoption of church ordinances marked a process of legal change and initiated new
18Most school curricula do not mention Bible reading (Strauss 1978). We provide information on school
hours, the short length of vacations, and the fact that city schools were free for poor children in Appendix A.
19Systematic efforts were made to identify talented children from poor backgrounds (Strauss 1978).
20Schooling for boys began at age six or seven and typically lasted five or six years. School days typically
began at 7AM (8AM in winter). Students went home for lunch and returned to school 1PM-4PM. Vacations
were relatively short. Classes were held throughout the calendar year, with vacations at Christmas and
Easter. In city schools, “Vacations were rare. But it was customary to cancel afternoon classes during
the hottest weeks of summer and to take a holiday at the time of the annual fair” (Strauss 1978; p. 187).
Wednesday afternoons and Sundays were free.
21In contrast, Catholic theologians and statesmen rejected public participation (Roeck 1999).
22Anti-corruption safeguards, including the formal institutionalization of audits for public finances, were
designed to reduce diversion. A concrete example of these innovations was the introduction of a “common
chest.” Wittenberg was a model: institutional change established an audited common chest in 1522, all
church income was to be collected under one administration, these resources were to be used to provide care
for the poor and sick and financial support to enable children of low-income parents to attend school and
university (Sehling 1902-2016).
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fixed investments in human capital and service provision (Hamm 1994; Strauss 1978). To
show how church ordinances related to legal change and to fixed investments, we present
data on the diffusion of jurisprudence and on the construction of schools and buildings used
in administration and service provision. The publication of books on jurisprudence provides
an indication of the diffusion of legal knowledge. In Figure 1 we show that publication
of jurisprudence books was similar in cities that did and did not adopt church ordinances
until the 1520s, and then diverged as cities adopting ordinances embarked on a process of
legal and institutional change (panel A). Figure 1 also shows that church ordinances were
also associated with subsequent differences in the construction of schools (panel B) and
in the construction of buildings used in administration and social welfare provision (panel
C).23 Until the 1540s, these construction patterns were similar in cities that did and did
not adopt church ordinances. In many cities that adopted institutional change, new schools
and municipal services made use of former Catholic Church buildings (Ocker 2006). Hence
new construction should be taken as just one indicator of the way institutional change was
associated with on-the-ground shifts in education and service provision.
We provide an analysis of the church ordinances in our data, where we examine specific
provisions in the ordinances and consider potential heterogeneity, in Appendix C.
2.2 The Political Process
During the early 1500s, the introduction of religious competition interacted with local shocks
to shift city politics.
The Reformation altered political competition across Germany. The circulation of
Martin Luther’s theses in 1517 led to the introduction of religious competition. The
collapse of the religious monopoly of the Catholic Church provided an opening for political
entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs built on Luther’s argument that the Catholic Church was
a rent-extracting organization, and developed political arguments for lower cost provision of
religious services and expanded provision of public goods (Cameron 1991). As a result, the
23This pattern of fixed investment is different from the pattern associated with the territorial adoption
of Protestantism by princes. At the territory-level, the adoption of Protestantism is not associated with a
significant shift towards school building and is associated with a large increase in the construction of palaces,
reflecting (i) the seizure of Catholic Church assets by princes and (ii) princes’ priorities (Cantoni, Dittmar,
and Yuchtman 2018). Evidence on construction is assembled from the multi-volume Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch,
which provides detailed histories urban development for of all cities in Germany.
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Figure 1: Jurisprudence and Construction
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This graph shows the cumulative number of (A) jurisprudence publications, (B) new school construction,
and (C) administrative and social welfare construction in cities that did and did not adopt public goods
institutions, measured by the passage of a church ordinance (cities with and without “Laws”). Publication
and construction data are from the Universal Short Title Catalogue and the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch,
respectively, for the 239 German cities we study in this paper. We classify all new school construction
as “School Construction” and all construction of buildings used by city governments and in non-education
social welfare and service provision as “Social & Administrative Construction”.
relative price of political action fell globally.24 This price reduction reflected spiritual factors:
notably, the reduced power of the threat of excommunication. It also reflected material
factors: the willingness of temporal authorities to enforce Catholic doctrine declined.
Cities had characteristics that made them the centers of public goods expansion. Cities
combined forms of jurisdictional autonomy and politically demanding middle classes that
together made innovation feasible, and explain why political innovation appeared first and
developed most in cities (Brady 2009; Ozment 1975). Hamm (1994; p. 201) observes: “Since
the urban constitutions – unlike those of the territories – made the regimes susceptible to
pressure from below, large groups of citizens could press successfully for religious changes
and, for a time, influence the magistrates’ will.” To expand public goods provision, city
governments adopted church ordinances.
The adoption of church ordinances depended on local politics. Citizens’ movements
drove city-level institutional change, and emerged without initial support from oligarchic
city governments or territorial lords (Dickens 1979).25 Cameron (1991; p. 240) observes,
24Religious competition changed the “market for salvation,” in which the Catholic Church could threaten
ex-communication. It also shifted the “market for legitimacy” in which rulers received religiously derived
sanction for their rule in exchange for economic concessions. Rulers faced by competing religious elites did
not enforce Catholic writ as before (Cantoni, Dittmar, and Yuchtman 2018).
25Princes’ preferences and city elites are discussed further below and in Appendix E.
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“As a rule neither the city patricians nor the local princes showed any sympathy for the
Reformation in the crucial period in the late 1520s and early 1530s; they identified themselves
with the old Church hierarchy. . . Popular agitation on a broad social base led to the formation
of a ‘burgher committee’.” The constituency for institutional change came from citizens who
were excluded from political power by oligarchic elites (Ozment 1975; Schilling 1983). While
territorial princes did exert some influence over the process of institutional change, our results
hold virtually unchanged when we study variation in institutions and outcomes across cities
within the same region or principality (Sections 4 to 6).26
Narrative evidence indicates the importance of political competition. In Wittenberg,
popular pressure drove the city council to defy the orders of the local prince and pass the
first church ordinance in 1522 (Lindberg 1977).27 In Augsburg, the patrician financial and
political elite remained loyal to the Catholic church, but riots by artisans forced the city
council to drop its policy of religious neutrality and led to legal change (Broadhead 1979;
Johnson 2009). In Northern cities, such as Rostock, Stralsund, Greifswald, Lu¨beck, and
Braunschweig the push for legal change was led by citizens excluded from power and had
a coup d’e´tat quality (Cameron 1991). In Zwickau, Lutheran publications were printed in
1523; the city council unsuccessfully attempted to suppress protests in 1524; the Reformation
was adopted in law in 1529 (Scribner 1979). Further discussion is provided in Appendix E.
Religious printing provides unique, high frequency evidence on religious and political
competition. The number of religious publications is an indicator of competition in the space
of ideas and, more broadly, in religion and politics in the 1500s (Pettegree 2005; Dittmar
and Seabold 2017). Figure 2 shows that religious publishing was similar in cities that did
and did not adopt church ordinances before the Reformation, and diverged in the first years
of the Reformation, before church ordinances began to be adopted starting in 1522. This
evidence, and our investigation of economic outcomes before and after the adoption of church
ordinances, invite the question of why some cities adopted and whether there are sources of
exogenous variation in adoption.28
26The changes in politics and monitoring persisted after the early 1500s: “the ‘common man’ in the cities
retained his capacity to challenge the magistrates” (Whaley 2012; p. 249).
27The city council passed the Wittenberg ordinance after it was unable to control popular protest (Scribner
1979). At the time, Luther was under house arrest at Wartburg castle, 200 kilometers away.
28Figure 2 examines the subset of cities that had printing presses in the 1500s (“ever printers”). Below we
consider how religious and political printing increased during the Reformation in response to plague shocks.
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Figure 2: Religious Publishing
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This graph shows the mean number of religious publications in cities that did and did not adopt church
ordinances (“Laws”). Data on religious publications are from the Universal Short Title Catalogue.
Plague outbreaks in the early 1500s delivered exogenous shocks to the political
equilibrium. These shocks cut across other demand-side differences between cities. We
use the timing of city-level plague shocks that interacted with the global shift in political
competition as a source of exogenous variation in order to establish comparisons that do not
reflect cultural and economic differences across cities that may have influenced demand for
institutional change and directly influenced economic outcomes.
Plague outbreaks in the early 1500s influenced city politics in several ways. Plague
outbreaks led to the breakdown of civic order and discredited city elites, who often fled
(Dinges 1995; Isenmann 2012). Plagues also changed the composition of the population:
in years following plagues new migrants typically arrived to replace the dead and acquired
political rights with several year lag (Isenmann 2012). In addition, experience with plague
shifted the salience of public goods provision. The public goods institutions developed by
political entrepreneurs incorporated provision for healthcare, including care during plagues
(Bugenhagen 1885; Grell 2002). These factors help clarify why the probability of institutional
These effects reflected increased ideological competition in cities that were already printing and increased
competition in cities that had not previously been printing, as discussed below.
12
change increased for cities exposed to plagues in the early 1500s.29 Given that religious
publications provide a measure of political competition, it is natural to wonder whether they
respond to plague shocks in a manner consistent with the narrative evidence. We show that
plague shocks do drive religious publications below (Section 6.3).
Several factors explain why not all Protestant cities adopted public goods institutions. A
large body of evidence documents that local elites did not initially favor institutional change
(Cameron 1991) and that citizen mobilization and disorder drove city councils to adopt
institutional change (Dickens 1982). In some cities, Protestantism diffused but political
compromises between elites and the population prevented institutional change. For example,
in Bautzen the Catholic bishop signed a contract agreeing to share the use of the Cathedral
(this contract still governs the use of church space in 2018). Bautzen became a Protestant
city but institutional change did not occur. Other cities adopted Protestantism under the
influence of a territorial lord, but without a popular mobilization for institutional change.
While there were some territorial Catholic interventions in the counter-reformation that
adopted innovations from the institutions we study (Strauss 1978), the consensus among
historians is that the provision of public goods in Catholic Germany was limited (Roeck 1999)
and that the presence of interventions in Catholic cities that borrowed from and responded
to the institutions we study will lead us to conservatively underestimate the impact of church
ordinances (Grell 2002).
2.3 Measuring Public Goods Institutions
We measure public goods institutions by the passage of a church ordinance in the 1500s.
We consider cities that adopted this institutional change that persisted as “treated.” In
contrast, cities that remained Catholic or that became Protestant without changing legal
29We provide detailed discussion of these dynamics in Section 6. These variations in demand for
institutional change are orthogonal to variations in the supply of Protestant ideas. Historians (Eisenstein
1980; Brady 2009) and economists (Rubin 2014) argue that the printing press shifted the supply of Reformist
ideas. Recent research argues that the diffusion of Protestantism was driven by competition in the use of
printing technology (Dittmar and Seabold 2017). Our research is fundamentally differentiated from this
work in that it studies a larger set of cities, including more cities without printing, and examines shocks
that were orthogonal to the supply-side shocks the research on printing has examined. Every printer death
documented in Dittmar and Seabold (2017) occurred outside of plague outbreaks studied here. Similarly,
our results hold when we study within-principality variation or control for distance from Wittenberg, which
Becker and Woessmann (2009) identify as a determinant of the diffusion of Protestant ideas.
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institutions are “untreated.” While a small number of cities experienced religious changes
after adopting these laws, our methodology provides a robust measure of institutional
change. A small number of cities that experienced later re-Catholicization preserved the
public goods institutions established by their church ordinances, however our findings are
robust to excluding these cities (see Appendix for discussion). A small number of cities
where institutional change was reversed after a few years are considered untreated in our
baseline analysis, which considers cities with new institutions that persisted to 1600 as
treated. However, we obtain virtually identical results when we conduct an intent-to-treat
analysis including the few cities where institutional change was reversed in the early 1500s.
We provide discussion of the institutions and our classification in Appendix A and
illustrative examples here. Bautzen is an example of a Protestant city which did not adopt
institutional change, as discussed above (see also Speer 2014). Augsburg and Amberg are
examples of cities where the institutions of the Reformation were established and persisted
despite forms of re-Catholicization. Augsburg adopted the institutions of the Reformation
1534-1537, but was assigned a Catholic city council by the emperor in 1548. The council did
not attempt to re-Catholicize the population and access to city services remained open to
Protestants (Stein 2009). Amberg passed a church ordinance in the 1540s, but was absorbed
into Catholic Bavaria in the early 1600s. The Bavarian authorities explicitly worked to
preserve the educational infrastructure they inherited in Amberg (Johnson 2009).
Figure 3 maps the cities in our data and illustrates the variation in which cities adopted
church ordinances. Figure 4 shows the cumulative share of cities that had adopted as of
each year. Most cities passed their first law by 1545. In 1546, the Schmalkaldic War broke
out between Protestant and Catholic princes, largely arresting diffusion. The Augsburg
Settlement (1555) established a new political equilibrium.30 City level institutional change
largely ended in 1555.
We focus on city-level ordinances for several reasons. City-level institutional change was
salient because city governments had significant state capacity and were subject to pressure
from citizens in ways territorial rulers were not (Cameron 1991; Hamm 1994). In the data, we
30The settlement included a provision, cuius regio, eius religio, which allowed local rulers to dictate the
religion in their realm, but maintained a complicated set of exceptions for cities where magistracies and
offices were to be shared and largely respected facts on the ground (Dittmar and Seabold 2017).
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Figure 3: Cities and Institutional Change
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This map shows cities with and without institutional change, measured by the adoption of a church ordinance
(“Reformation Law”). This map also displays historic territories from Nu¨ssli (2008).
Figure 4: The Share of Cities Adopting Institutional Change
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This graph shows the share of cities with institutional change, measured by the adoption of a church ordinance
(“Share Cities with Laws”). Dashed lines mark the spread of Luther’s ideas in 1518, the Schmalkaldic War
of 1546, and the Peace of Augsburg in 1555.
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find that the within-principality difference in outcomes between “treated” and “untreated”
cities is virtually identical to the difference across the entire population of cities.31
3 Data
Definition of Sample – We focus on institutions and outcomes in 239 German-speaking
cities with population observed in 1800 in Bairoch, Batou, and Che`vre (1988) and
information on the non-institutional diffusion of Protestantism recorded in Cantoni (2012).32
Legal institutions of the Reformation – Our principal data source on Protestant church
ordinances is the multi-volume collection Die evangelischen Kirchenordnungen des XVI.
Jahrhunderts (Sehling 1902-2016).33 We review the text of the laws and manually code
which cities adopted institutional change.
Upper Tail Human Capital – Data on individuals with upper tail human capital are from
the Deutsche Biographie (Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 2015). The Deutsche
Biographie is a project of the Historical Commission of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences
(Reinert, Schrott, and Ebneth 2015), provides the most definitive record of upper tail human
capital individuals in German history, and was designed to provide comprehensive coverage
across regions and religions (Hockerts 2008). We identify over 3,000 individuals born in or
migrating to our baseline set of cities from 1430 to 1819. We classify individual occupations
in six principal sectors: (1) government; (2) church; (3) education; (4) business; (5) arts;
and (6) medicine.34 We provide detailed discussion of the nature and construction of the
Deutsche Biographie, and our classification of occupations, in Appendix A.35
31This shows that important variation “lives” at the city-level and not the territorial-level. Consistent
with this, we find differences in school construction by city-level ordinance, while Cantoni, Dittmar, and
Yuchtman (2018) find no evidence that school construction was higher in Protestant territories as a whole.
32We restrict to cities in contemporary Germany and Poland that have consistent evidence on institutional
change and appear in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch, a comprehensive encyclopedia of over 2,000 German cities
and towns (described below). Due to the nature of the sources, our analysis excludes Austrian cities and
Alsatian cites.
33Appendix A provides a complete list of volumes and a description of these and other sources.
34In addition to these principal sectors, a number of individuals had military careers or were nobles.
35For selective inclusion into the Deutsche Biographie to threaten our research design what would be
required is that people born in or migrating to cities that adopted institutional change are selectively included.
However, our results hold if we restrict analysis to super-star individuals for whom selective inclusion is not
plausible, as discussed in Appendix B. Our results are also unlikely to be explained by shocks that destroyed
historical records as discussed in Appendix A.
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City Populations – City population data are from Bairoch, Batou, and Che`vre (1988), who
record populations for urban agglomerations that ever reached 5,000 inhabitants between
1000 and 1800 at 100 year intervals. A number of cities in the Bairoch data have no recorded
observation for population in 1500. In Appendix A we collect evidence on each such city
from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch to document when city size first appears in the historical
record.
Plague Outbreaks – We construct city-year level data on plague outbreaks from Biraben
(1975), which provides quantitative data designed to characterize the frequency, duration,
and variations in incidence of the plague in European history. Biraben (1975) collects
evidence on the presence of major outbreaks (1/0), motivated by the fact that outbreaks were
public events that left a mark in the historical record and because the evidence on mortality
embodies measurement error and is not available for a large proportion of outbreaks.
City Characteristics – Data on the hometowns of students receiving university degrees
from 1398 to 1517 are from Schwinges and Hesse (2015).36 Data on books printed in each city
are from the Universal Short Title Catalogue. Data on market rights and city incorporation
are from Cantoni and Yuchtman (2014). Data on navigable rivers, the ecclesiastical status of
cities, monasteries and mendicant orders, and the diffusion of Protestantism as the dominant
city-level religion are from Cantoni (2012). Data on city institutions governing electoral
participation, public (Burgher) representation in assemblies, and constitutions securing guild
representation on city councils are from Wahl (2016; 2017) and the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch.
We study cities within 29 territories mapped by Nu¨ssli (2008), and within 75 principalities
recorded by the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch as of circa 1500 (see Appendix A for details).
4 Public Goods Institutions and Human Capital
4.1 Motivation
In this section we test our hypotheses on the relationship between the adoption of public
goods institutions and upper tail human capital using a difference-in-differences identification
36The Repertorium Academicum Germanicum project (Schwinges and Hesse 2015) provides individual-
level data on graduates from historic German universities. These data are only available through 1550 due to
the nature of the underlying sources. Because long-run data on university degree recipients after institutional
change are not available we do not study degrees as outcome in this paper.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Upper Tail Human Capital
Cities with Law Cities without Law Difference
Upper Tail Human Capital N Mean Sd N Mean Sd HL Statistic
Locally Born Pre-1520 103 1.02 3.37 136 0.20 0.64 0.00xxx
Locally Born Post-1520 103 15.01 26.61 136 3.59 7.07 3.00***
Migrants Pre-1520 103 0.41 0.86 136 0.13 0.67 0.00xxx
Migrants Post-1520 103 8.49 19.04 136 1.96 4.94 1.00xxx
Total Pre-1520 103 1.42 3.89 136 0.32 1.13 0.00
Total Post-1520 103 23.50 44.89 136 5.54 11.55 5.00***
Upper tail human capital is measured by the number of people observed in the Deutsche Biographie. Locally
born are people born in a given city i. Migrants to any given city i are individuals born in some other
location j who died in city i. The last column presents the Hodges-Lehmann non-parametric statistic for
the difference (median shift) between cities with laws and cities without laws. We use the Hodges-Lehmann
statistic because we are examining non-negative distributions for which the standard deviation is larger than
the mean and as a test statistic that is robust to outliers. Statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90%
levels denoted ***, **, and *, respectively.
strategy. We use the adoption of city-level church ordinances (laws) as a measure of public
goods institutions. We show that the effects were most immediate in the sectors targeted
by reformers – government, education, and church. We find lagged spillover effects on the
business sector. We distinguish migration and local formation, motivated by the historical
evidence on reformers’ efforts to promote migration of talented school children and on the
migration of educated elites who themselves participated in the establishment of the political
equilibria. Observed migration reflects both human capital and opportunities.
To study the migration and formation of upper tail human capital we collect biographical
data on all individuals in the Deutsche Biographie who either were born in or migrated to the
239 cities in our data between 1420 and 1820. We classify as a migrant any individual who
died in a given city, but was born in some other location. Observed migrants thus comprise
both individuals who migrated as adults and those who were identified as promising students
and offered school places in cities while minors. We classify as local formation individuals
born in a given city in our data. Table 1 presents summary statistics and shows significant
differences in the period after institutional change.
Our econometric analysis is motivated by Figure 5, which plots the raw data and shows
a sharp jump in migration into cities that adopted new laws (i.e. church ordinances) in
the 1520s. Figure 5 shows that cities with and without these laws were attracting similar
numbers of migrants and had similar trends before the Reformation, that there is a sharp
18
Figure 5: The Migration of Upper Tail Human Capital
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This graph plots the number of migrants observed in the Deutsche Biographie at the decade level in cities
with and without church ordinances (“Laws”). Migrants are identified as people living and dying in town i
but born in some other location j. The vertical line is at 1517, the year Luther’s theses began circulating.
and persistent increase in migration observed in cities with laws starting in the 1520s, and
that the evolution in the number of migrants in cities without laws does not change during
the Reformation.37 Significantly, cities with laws overwhelmingly attracted these migrants
from smaller towns, not from cities without laws. Net migration from untreated to treated
cities was virtually zero as shown in Appendix B.38 We also find that our results are not
explained by other institutional changes, examining shifts in city-level institutions governing
(1) participatory elections for city councils, (2) citizen representation on assemblies, and (3)
formal representation for guilds on city councils, as discussed below.
37In Appendix B we show that “untreated” Protestant and Catholic cities evolve similarly. The observed
jump in the data should not be interpreted as a direct measure of the local treatment effect, since some
of the migrants we observe in the 1520s became famous due to their role in the institutionalization of the
Reformation or migrated in earlier periods.
38An identifying assumption in the empirical work below is that cities were stable treatment units.
Consistent with this assumption, we find differential local formation in treated cities. The absence of cross-
city migration effects does not rule out the possibility of some cross-city spillover effects in the rural-to-urban
migration. However, it is unlikely that these drove the large differences in local formation that we find.
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4.2 Results
Baseline Estimates – We present regression estimates that document the level and trend
shifts in human capital, controlling for differences in underlying city-specific trends. We
estimate a model:
Peopleit = β0 + β1(Postt × Lawi) + β2(Postt × Trendt × Lawi)+
β3(Postt × Protestanti) + β4(Postt × Trendt × Protestanti)+
φiTrendit + δt,region + ǫit
(1)
Here the parameters of interest are β1 and β2, which capture the level and trend
shift, respectively, for cities that adopted church ordinances (“Law”) in the post-period.
Parameters β3 and β4 test for any level or trend shift associated with the adoption of
Protestantism. The φi are city-specific time trends. The δt,region are region-time-period
fixed effects (e.g. all cities in Saxony in a given period). We present specifications in which
the regions are 29 territories from Nu¨ssli (2008) and specifications in which the regions are 75
principalities (jurisdictions) recorded in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. We normalize the linear
trend to be time 0 in the period before treatment (i.e. 1470-1519).39
Table 2 reports our estimates. In Panel A, the outcome is the log of migration plus one.
We examine upper tail human capital migration in fifty year periods from 1420 through
1819.40 The post period begins 1520. We test for and find significant level shifts in Columns
1-5. Following the adoption of church ordinances the migration of upper tail human capital
rises by 0.22-0.30 log points in treated cities. These effects hold when we control for the
adoption of Protestantism, which is itself not a significant factor (column 2).
One might wonder whether the adoption of church ordinances reflected the geographic
diffusion or intensity of Protestantism operating through distance to Wittenberg (Becker
and Woessmann 2009) or characteristics shared by cities at the regional level. We address
this question by studying variation within region-year (column 3) and within principality-
year (column 4), and find consistent results. We study variation in adoption of church
39We present robustness exercises on considering the treatment time period and the outcome measure in
the Appendix.
40We examine the data in 50 year periods to account for the fact that in the majority of observations we
do not know the precise year or decade of migration.
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ordinances and religion within regions and principalities as constituted in 1500. We do this
because jurisdictions frequently changed over time, in part as an outcome of the political
processes we analyze (Whaley 2012).41 To be clear, estimates without fixed effects and with
region-year or principality-year fixed effects examine distinct counterfactuals. Region-year
fixed effects absorb regional factors. Principality-year fixed effects absorb differences shared
by cities that were near neighbors and subject to the same ruler in 1500. To limit the
counterfactual to Protestant cities without laws, in column 5 we restrict analysis to cities
in religiously homogeneous principalities.42 The stability of our results indicates that the
variation in outcomes is explained by local differences in public goods institutions, and not
by the adoption of Protestantism or regional differences.43
We examine differences in human capital trends in columns 6-10. We control for
underlying city-specific trends and find that adoption of public goods institutions was
associated with both a positive level effect of 0.27-0.38 log points and positive shift in the
post-trend of 0.07-0.12 log points. The estimated shift in the post period trend implies that
after 100 years migration would increase about 14-16 percent, given that time is measured in
50 year periods. These estimates hold controlling for region-year and principality-year fixed
effects (columns 6-9). However, the trend estimate is less precisely estimated when we study
variation within religiously homogeneous principalities (column 10).44
In Panel B, we examine the local formation of human capital and find consistent results.
We measure human capital formation with the log of the number of local individuals in the
41We also observe religious heterogeneity across cities in the same region after the Peace of Augsburg. We
provide a complete list of the principalities and regions each city belonged to in Appendix B. We provide
further historical evidence on religious heterogeneity in Appendix E. We do not observe the principality of
5 cities in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch.
42When we restrict to religiously homogeneous principalities, we drop “free” cities, which were legally free
from the rule of a territorial lord but subject to the Holy Roman emperor. There are 167 cities in religiously
homogeneous principalities, but 80 of these are in principalities without variation in law. The variation is
across 14 Protestant principalities, containing a total of 87 cities, of which 43 have a law and 44 do not.
43Detailed formal records reveal that reformers did not achieve their goals in terms of shifting culture and
individual behavior in the 1500s (Sehling 1902-2016; Strauss 1978). That said, the cultural effects of the
new equilibrium may have influenced long-run development.
44Our results are not explained by other changes in local politics and institutions. In unreported results
we study three key types of city-level changes in political institutions are observed in German cities between
1400 and 1800, involving the establishment and elimination of: (1) participatory elections, in which citizens
were able to vote for city council members; (2) citizen representation, including the meeting of assemblies
on which citizens were represented; and (3) guild constitutions, in which guilds were given representation on
city councils (Wahl 2016). Our results do not change when we control separately for the presence of each of
these dimensions of institutions using data from Wahl (2017) and the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch.
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Deutsche Biographie plus one. We find positive level and trend shifts in cities that adopted
institutional change in the post-period. The level effects hold controlling for city-specific
trends and region-year and principality-year fixed effects, whereas the trend effects remain
positive but are not statistically significant within principality-years.
Flexible Model –We next flexibly study how migration and local human capital formation
varied with “ever-treated” status (Law) period-by-period. We estimate regressions:
ln(Peopleit + 1) = θi + δt +
1770∑
s=1420
βs(Lawi × δs) + ǫit (2)
The parameters of interest are the βs, which capture the period-specific human capital
advantage enjoyed by treated cities, controlling for city and time fixed effects θi and δt.
Figure 6 presents our estimates. We study migration in Panel A and the formation of
human capital in Panel B. In each panel, we present four sets of comparisons. Graph I
presents estimates with city and year fixed effects. Graph II adds region-year fixed effects to
control for factors shared by all cities in a given region and time. We observe no significant
differences between cities that adopted institutional change and cities that did not before
the 1520s. However, in graph III we further account for differential pre-trends by controlling
for pre-treatment outcomes interacted with the complete set of time-period indicators. In
graph IV, we study variation within principality-year.
Our results in Panel A show that migration increased as and immediately after church
ordinances were adopted. Our results in Panel B show that the local formation of human
capital also increased following the adoption of ordinances, but that this response was
more gradual and became statistically significant over time. This is consistent with the
returns to institutional change interacting with evolving economic opportunities (Becker
and Woessmann 2009; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002).45
Allocation of Human Capital Across Sectors – To provide additional evidence on the
45Our results are not explained by the selective inclusion of marginal individuals into the Deutsche
Biographie. Our results hold for individuals for whom there is no ambiguity about inclusion, e.g. individuals
with extended biographical essays in the Deutsche Biographie as discussed and shown below. We note that
while cities that adopted institutional change were attracting and producing fewer upper tail human capital
individuals in the 1370-1419 period, there is no significant difference between treated and untreated cities
over the period 1420-1469 relative to the 1470-1519 baseline. Moreover, when examine “super-star” upper
tail human capital we observe no significant pre-treatment differences (Appendix B).
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channels through which political and institutional change impacted the economy, we examine
shifts in upper tail human capital across occupational sectors.
We examine the allocation of upper tail human capital across six occupational sectors:
government (20%), church (15%), education (16%), business (18%), arts (26%), and medicine
(5%). We measure the allocation of human capital by classifying the professions of all
individuals in the Deutsche Biographie (see Appendix A). We study the allocation of upper
tail human capital using the flexible difference-in-difference regression design of Equation
2, and maintaining the distinction between migration and local formation. We study the
presence of upper tail human capital in a sector, measured 1/0. We examine this binary
outcome because most of the variation at the city-sector-period level is between having zero
or one observed individuals.
Figure 7 presents our estimates. We estimate regressions controlling for city fixed effects,
region-year fixed effects, and pre-treatment outcomes (as in Figure 6). We use region-year
fixed effects to study how the new equilibrium formalized in church ordinances drove increases
in upper tail human capital even when we take as the counterfactual cities in the same
region and time period. In Panel A, the outcome is a binary variable for the presence of any
upper tail human capital migrants in a given city-period active in a specific occupational
sector. Panel A shows that cities that adopted public goods laws in the 1500s experienced
a large, immediate increase in migration in the government, church, and education sectors,
consistent with our predictions. Migration in the arts also responded quickly. In contrast, the
response in business sector migration was more gradual, increasing and becoming statistically
significant over time.
Panel B presents estimates studying the formation of upper tail human capital by sector.
We find that the formation of human capital responded less immediately to the adoption
of ordinances than migration did. The formation of local human capital in the government
sector increased sharply one period after adoption. But as with migration, the formation
of human capital in the government sector rises relatively quickly, whereas the business
sector increases over time and becomes highly significant in later periods. In contrast
with migration, the formation of human capital for church in cities that adopted ordinances
increases but then declines, and is no longer significant by the 1700s.
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Figure 7: Upper Tail Human Capital by Sector
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This figure graphs regression estimates examining the relationship between the adoption of church ordinances
and upper tail human capital at the city-sector-time-period level. The outcomes are binary variables for any
upper tail human capital individuals in a city-sector-time cell, estimated separately for migrants and local
formation. The figure presents parameter estimates on interactions between time period fixed effects and an
indicator for cities that adopted church ordinances, with 95% confidence intervals. All regressions control for
city fixed effects, region-by-time-period fixed effects, and pre-1520 outcomes interacted with the complete set
of time period indicators. Time is measured in 50-year periods 1420 through 1819. Sectors are as described
in the text. Standard errors clustered at the city level are used to construct confidence intervals.
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Discussion and Robustness – The nature of the migration process helps explain the
immediate response in migration. Migration flows partly reflected geographic sorting by
adults, specifically including people involved in the establishment of the new equilibrium.
Cities that adopted church ordinances also directly promoted the migration of upper tail
human capital during the educational process. Recruiters compiled extensive dossiers on
promising children from small towns (Strauss 1978), who show up as migrants in our data.
Both selective sorting and recruitment help explain why strong migration effects are observed
in the immediate post-1520 periods.
It is unlikely that selective inclusion into the Deutsche Biographie explains our findings.
We find similar results when we restrict the analysis to the approximately 25 percent of
individuals who were sufficiently important to merit an extended biographical essay in the
Deutsche Biographie. Individuals with extended biographies were not plausibly subject to
selective inclusion into the Deutsche Biographie. For these people, we also observe sharp
effects for individuals active in business in the immediate post-1520 periods, particularly
for migration. For local formation, the results are more muted and point towards spillover
effects on sectors that were not directly targeted, notably business. We report these results
in Appendix B, where we also discuss how the Deutsche Biographie was prepared by the
Bavarian Historical Commission with the express aim of capturing unbiased evidence. To
test for selective inclusion, we also examine the presence of nobles and find nobles are not
more frequently observed in cities with laws except during the Thirty Years War period.
An identifying assumption for our analysis is that treatment is not correlated with
unobservables that could themselves drive the outcome. We address remaining questions
about the potential for selective adoption using an IV strategy in Section 6.
5 Public Goods Institutions and Long-Run Outcomes
In this section, we test the hypothesis that political and institutional change embodied in
church ordinances drove long-run population growth and upper tail human capital intensity.
We study city population as a measure of local economic activity (De Long and Shleifer
1993; Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 1995; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005a).
We present panel and cross-sectional estimates in this section.
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The challenge for panel research designs is that for the majority of treated cities,
population data are observed only after treatment. For instance, we do not observe
population in 1500 for 129 out of 239 cities because they were too small to be recorded.46 We
therefore consider two outcomes: (1) whether and when towns became cities with observed
population and (2) whether and when towns became large enough to be in the top 100 cities
ranked by population in a given year. We study these binary outcomes to avoid “conditional
on positive” selection bias in a research design that includes unit fixed effects (Angrist and
Pischke 2008). This selection bias is a concern because many initially small places only grew
large enough to be observed after treatment.47 We study being in the top 100 as a broad
measure of size that we observe for all cities and periods.
We estimate panel regressions studying how the adoption of ordinances impacted whether
and when towns become cities and when cities became relatively large.
Yit = θi + δjt + β(Lawi × Postt) + γ(Protestanti × Postt) + ǫit (3)
Yit is a binary variable for locations (1) being cities with population observed in period t or
(2) being a city with population in the top 100. Lawi and Protestanti are indicators for the
adoption of church ordinances and Protestantism, respectively. The θi and δjt are city and
region-by-time-period fixed effects. We examine data at the city-century level 1300 to 1800,
with the “Post” period running 1600 to 1800.
Table 3 reports our estimates. Columns 1-4 study 2,230 German towns and show that
towns that adopted institutional change were approximately 7 percent more likely to be
observed as cities in the post-treatment period.48 This result holds controlling for region-
by-year fixed effects and whether a city adopted Protestantism.49 Columns 5-7 show that
cities were 12 percent more likely to be in the top 100 cities by population after adopting
46We present detailed evidence on each individual town where population data is unobserved in 1500 in
Bairoch, Batou, and Che`vre (1988) in Appendix A, to confirm that they were indeed small in 1500.
47There are only 30 cities in the balanced panel with population observed every century 1300 through
1800. Our study thus contrasts with Cantoni (2015), which (1) studies the relationship between a measure
of non-institutionalized Protestantism and city outcomes and (2) only studies population outcomes within
the set of city-years where population is observed.
48A small number of towns were absorbed into larger cities over our sample period. Here we analyze the
balanced panel of towns that were not absorbed into other cities.
49We do not consider principality-year fixed effects because of ambiguities assigning each town to a
principality.
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ordinances, while Protestantism does not explain this variation. Column 8 shows that the
post-period effect of adoption is entirely driven by a change in the trend, consistent with an
underlying growth effect.
Table 3: Public Goods Institutions and City Population in the Panel
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Outcome: Population Observed Outcome: Population in Top 100
Data on All Towns Data on Cities
Post × Law 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.01 0.12∗∗ 0.13∗∗ -0.10
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
Post × Protestant 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.01 -0.05 -0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12)
Post × Law × Trend 0.03∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.01) (0.04)
Post × Prot × Trend 0.02∗∗ 0.00
(0.01) (0.06)
Observations 13380 13380 13380 13380 1434 1434 1434 1434
Town FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regression estimates examining city population outcomes. In Columns 1-4, the outcome
is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a town has population observed in Bairoch, Batou, and Che`vre
(1988). Columns 1-4 examine the 2,230 towns recorded in the Deutsches Sta¨detebuch. In columns 5-8 the
outcome is a binary variable for cities with population in the top 100 and analysis is restricted to 239 cities
observed in Bairoch, Batou, and Che`vre (1988). “Post × Law” interacts an indicator for institutional change
and the post-1520 period. “Post × Protestant” interacts an indicator for cities that adopted Protestantism
and the post-1520 period. Time trend interactions measure time in centuries from year 1500 (100 years is
one time unit). We measure Protestantism using Cantoni (2012) for cities and the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch for
towns not in Cantoni (2012). Data on population are at 100-year intervals 1300 through 1800. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the town (city) level.
We next examine long-run growth in the cross-section. Table 4 presents two key facts
on the relationship between initial city population, the adoption of church ordinances, and
population in 1800. First, cities that adopted these institutional changes were 45 log points
(57 percent) larger in 1800 than cities that did not. Second, cities that were large in 1500
were more likely to adopt (column 8), but the relationship between adoption and long-run
population is significant and positive for all except for the few cities that were initially large.
The positive relationship between adoption and growth is sharp in locations that had not
been previously dynamic. Several factors may explain why adoption does not predict growth
in the very largest cities. Large cities in this period were constrained by the need to transport
food long-distance and thus grew slowly (Dittmar 2015), and the public goods institutions we
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Table 4: Log Population in 1800 by Institutional Change Status and Initial Size
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Population Cities with Law Cities without Law Difference Share Share
in 1500 N Mean Sd N Mean Sd in Means with Law of Cities
Unobserved 35 1.81 0.43 94 1.59 0.50 0.22 [0.01] 0.27 0.54
1-5 Thousand 32 2.01 0.61 30 1.69 0.57 0.32 [0.04] 0.52 0.26
6-10 Thousand 20 2.37 0.85 8 2.50 0.59 -0.13 [0.66] 0.71 0.12
11-20 Thousand 12 2.94 0.96 2 3.43 0.36 -0.49 [0.26] 0.86 0.06
21+ Thousand 4 3.29 0.13 2 3.90 0.27 -0.61 [0.16] 0.67 0.03
All Cities 103 2.17 0.76 136 1.73 0.65 0.45 [0.00] 0.43 1.00
This table presents the summary statistics for log city population in 1800 by institutional change status and
initial pre-Reformation city size. Institutional change is measured by an indicator variable for whether a
city had a church ordinance (“Law”) by 1600. Populations are measured in thousands: ln(population/1000).
P-values for the statistical significance of differences in means in square brackets in column 7. Column
8 reports the share of cities with a church ordinance in each initial size category for population in 1500.
Column 9 reports the share of total cities in each initial size category.
study may had limited impact on this constraint. In addition, there is suggestive case study
evidence of negative selection into institutional change among the largest cities (Scribner
1976). We present complete summary statistics on all variables in the Appendix.
To study the relationship between the adoption of church ordinances (Law) and long-run
population and human capital outcomes, we estimate the following regression:
Yi = c+ α·Lawi + γ ·Xi +ǫi, (4)
where Yi is the logarithm of population in 1800 and Lawi = 1 if city i had a law. The
control variables (Xi) include our outcome measure of upper tail human capital before
1517 and the number of students from each city receiving university degrees separately
decade-by-decade over the 1400s, to absorb human capital pre-trends. We also control for
whether cities had market rights in 1517, were incorporated by 1517, indicators for printing,
universities, Free-Imperial cities, the average number of pre-1500s plagues, the informal
diffusion of Protestantism, and geographic controls. We control for initial population either
with categorical fixed effects or for log population in 1500, setting this to 0 for unobserved
cities and including an indicator for unobserved status. We present summary statistics in
Appendix A.
Table 5 shows the results from estimating equation (4). The outcome in Panel A is
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log population in 1800. The outcome in Panel B is upper tail human capital 1750-1799,
measured as the log of the sum of migrants and local formation. The outcome in Panel C is
the number of upper tail human capital individuals 1750-1799 per 1,000 population in 1800.
Across specifications, we find that cities with laws institutionalizing public goods had 35-40
percent more upper tail human capital in the late 1700s, were 24-37 percent larger in 1800,
and thus were more upper tail human capital intensive. In column 1 we control for region
fixed effects, upper tail human capital 1470-1519 and 1420-1469 separately, and population
in 1500 with categorical indicator variables.
Our main result holds when we control for initial conditions, human capital pre-trends,
and the non-institutional diffusion of Protestantism. The estimate is slightly stronger and
more precise when we control for initial conditions and human capital pre-trends in column
2. The point estimate is virtually unchanged when we include longitude, latitude, and their
interaction as proxies for the potential growth advantages of proximity to Atlantic ports
and city age in column 3. To distinguish the variation explained by laws from the variation
explained by the non-institutional diffusion of Protestantism we use Cantoni’s (2012) data
on the adoption of Protestantism. We also control for distance from Wittenberg (Becker
and Woessmann 2009), but most variation in distance is already absorbed in region fixed
effects. In column 4, we use the same controls as Cantoni (2012) and find that the diffusion
of Protestantism had no significant relationship with outcomes. We find the point estimate
on laws is positive and significant controlling for the adoption of Protestantism in column 5.
In column 6, we control for log population in 1500 and find the results are robust.50 Column
7 shows our results hold when study variation within religiously homogeneous principalities,
where counterfactual is Protestant cities without ordinances.
We also find no evidence that the adoption of public goods institutions interacted with
initial city characteristics to predict outcomes, with one exception. In ex ante large cities
we find a negative differential relationship between Reformation institutions and population
growth.51 We find no differential human capital or growth effect for institutions in Free-
Imperial cities, cities with many university students, cities with printing, or cities with
50We assign a value of 0 for all cities with population unobserved in 1500 and include an indicator for
unobserved status. We provide detailed evidence on these cities in the Appendix.
51In pre-industrial Europe, the largest cities were constrained by the need to transport food over distance
and grew relatively slowly (Dittmar 2015). The political and institutional changes we study may not have
relaxed this constraint.
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Table 5: OLS Analysis of Long-Run Outcomes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Panel A: City Population
Outcome: Ln Population in 1800
Law 0.24∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.16)
Protestant -0.08 -0.11 -0.12
(0.18) (0.17) (0.21)
Observations 239 239 239 239 239 239 167
R2 0.47 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.65
Panel B: Human Capital
Outcome: Ln Upper Tail Human Capital 1750-1799
Law 0.35∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.39∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.21)
Protestant 0.20 0.19 0.19
(0.20) (0.22) (0.22)
Observations 239 239 239 239 239 239 167
R2 0.29 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.60
Panel C: Human Capital Intensity
Outcome: Upper Tail Human Capital per 1,000
Law 0.09∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.08∗ 0.10
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
Protestant 0.09 0.09 0.09
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Observations 239 239 239 239 239 239 167
R2 0.25 0.42 0.42 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.59
Controls that Vary Across Specifications
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Population FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Main controls No Yes Yes No No No No
Geo Controls No No Yes No No No No
Cantoni Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Population 1500 No No No No No Yes No
Principality FE No No No No No No Yes
This table presents the regression estimates of the relationship between the adoption of church ordinances (“Law”) and long-run
outcomes. Outcomes are: in Panel A log population in 1800; in Panel B the log of upper tail human capital plus one 1750-1799;
and in Panel C upper tail human capital individuals 1750-1799 per 1,000 population in 1800. Upper tail human capital is
the sum of locally born individuals and migrants from the Deutsche Biographie. “Law” is an indicator. “Protestant” is an
indicator for Protestant cities (Cantoni 2012). All regressions control for Ln Upper Tail Human Capital in 1420-1469 and
1470-1519. Columns 1-6 control for 29 region fixed effects using Nu¨ssli (2008). Column 7 controls for 75 principality fixed
effects using the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. “Main Controls” are: Market rights by 1517; town incorporated by 1517; indicators
for books printed pre-1517 (0, 1-100, 101-1000, 1001+), university by 1517; the number of students from each city receiving
university degrees separately each 10-year period starting 1398 through 1508; and the average number of plagues from 1349
to 1499. “Geo Controls” are longitude, latitude, and their interaction. “Cantoni Controls” are year city founded and year
turned Protestant, indicators for rivers, Hansa cities, Free-Imperial status, monasteries, university, printing, and distance to
Wittenberg. Population fixed effects are indicators for 1500 population data: missing, 1,000-5,000, 6,000-10,000, 11,000-20,000,
and 20,000+. Column 6 controls for log population in 1500, setting log population to 0 for cities with data unobserved, and an
indicator for cities with data unobserved. Column 7 restricts analysis to religiously homogeneous principalities. Standard errors
are clustered at the region (principality) level. Statistical significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level denoted
“*”, “**”, and “***”. 32
market rights. We report these results in Appendix C.
6 Plague Shocks as a Source of Exogenous Variation
The fact that cities that adopted public goods institutions subsequently developed faster
invites questions about (1) why some cities adopted and others did not and (2) whether
there are sources of exogenous variation in adoption. One possibility is that the Reformation
suddenly and exogenously allowed cities with different underlying characteristics to select
different public goods institutions. In this case, differences in growth could have been driven
in part by these underlying characteristics, and not only the adoption of public goods
institutions. To address this potential concern, we use the timing of plague outbreaks in
the early 1500s as an instrumental variable (IV) to isolate exogenous variation in adoption.
The IV analysis also gives us a setting in which to test our predictions about the political
process that leads to adoption.
6.1 Explaining the Instrumental Variable Methodology
In this section we explain our methodology, how plagues shifted politics and institutions, and
why the timing of plagues provides exogenous variation. We also preview evidence indicating
that plagues in the 1500s did not shift outcomes through other channels.
Mechanism: How The Timing of Plagues Shifted Politics and Institutions
Plagues in the early 1500s lowered the relative price of political action and increased
local demand for public goods institutions. These plagues interacted with the global shift
in politics due to the Reformation. The Reformation expanded the set of institutional
arrangements in a non-democratic political marketplace.
The political implications of plague outbreaks changed with the introduction of religious
competition. It was not unusual for 1/4 of a town’s population to die (Slack 2012). During
outbreaks, elites often died and fled, and civic order frequently broke down (Dinges 1995;
Isenmann 2012). Experience with plague discredited elites, lowering the relative price of
local political action.52 Before religious competition led to the articulation of institutional
52Protestant reformers criticized past city council behavior during plagues and advocated institutional
change. For example, in 1533 Andreas Osiander scolded Nu¨rnberg’s city council for previously abandoning
the city during plague outbreaks in his famous “Plague Sermon” and authored a church ordinance.
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alternatives, these shocks did not lead to institutional change. Political competition changed
in the 1500s as a new institutional agenda for public goods provision was developed by
ideological entrepreneurs. Church ordinances were institutional blueprints that aimed to
ensure good governance. The plague and public health provision figured prominently in
these ordinances, which explicitly formalize the provision of health and pastoral care.53 In
the 1500s, citizens who had and had not experienced plagues were thus suddenly given a
new choice in political markets relating to social service provision.54
The historical evidence on political competition shapes how we construct our IV. The
period characterized by increased political competition started with the dissemination of
Luther’s theses in 1517. City-level institutional change was arrested by the Schmalkaldic War
(1544-5) and the Peace of Augsburg (1555).55 In our baseline analysis, we use plague exposure
between 1500 and 1522, the year of the first city ordinance, as an IV. By examining plagues
only up to 1522, we ensure that we do not attribute adoption to plagues that occurred later.56
However, we show that plagues after 1522 also predict adoption and growth, consistent with
our baseline analysis, particularly among cities that were not early adopters.
Exogeneity: Randomness in the Timing of Plague Outbreaks
We use variation in plague within a narrow time period as our instrumental variable to
isolate shocks. Clearly, plague outbreaks could reflect underlying differences across cities and
be endogenous to economic development: cities on trade networks were in general more likely
to experience outbreaks. To isolate random variation, we study outbreaks in the early 1500s
conditional on underlying trends and long-run variation in plague that might be correlated
with other characteristics that directly shaped economic development.57
53Almost all church ordinances contain provisions on directing priests to visit the sick and offer consolation.
In contrast, Catholic theologians and statesmen, “rejected public participation entirely or wanted to allow it
in only very reduced measure” (Roeck 1999; p. 286). Catholic cities outside Germany did develop strategies
to address the plague, e.g. in Italy (Cipolla 1992).
54Similar dynamics are observed in contemporary research on AIDS in Africa, which shows that service
provision drives conversion to a new religion (Trinitapoli and Weinreb 2012).
55City-level politics played a key role in institutional change before the Schmalkaldic war; afterwards
political initiative largely shifted to territorial rulers (Hamm 1994).
56Because the adoption of ordinances led to more in-migration, it is possible that adoption could have
increased the risk of plague, as we discuss below. In general, outbreaks shifted the institutional preferences of
the survivors and changed the composition of the population by attracting a subsequent influx of migrants.
Isenmann (2012) observes that typically the number of new property owning citizens with voting rights
(Neubu¨rger) rose dramatically after plagues, but new burghers only obtained voting rights after a period of
5 to 10 years residency, which may be one reason why political change often occurred with lags.
57We also condition on our measure of human capital outcomes observed over two periods before the
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Our methodology is supported by research in historical epidemiology which emphasizes
that the short-run distribution of plague outbreaks was random, conditional on observables,
and was geographically localized (Biraben 1975; Slack 1988). Historic plagues outbreaks were
characteristically observed in “compartmentalized” locations and not spreading neighbor-
to-neighbor (Biraben 1975; p. 285). Among the notable “puzzling features in the spread
of plague” was that it “missed some towns in its transit along major highways” and was
characterized by “irregular timing” (Slack 1988; p. 435).
Figure 8 illustrates the short-run randomness of plague outbreaks and the variation in
the IV for select cities: outbreaks from the beginning of the century to the passage of the
first law in 1522. The timing and frequency of outbreaks was highly variable across cities.
Neighboring cities experienced outbreaks at different times, for example Mainz and Frankfurt
am Main, which are less than 50 kilometers apart. Others experienced few or no major
outbreaks despite being important urban centers, like Frankfurt, Ulm, and Regensburg.
We provide several additional pieces of evidence that support the exogeneity assumption
in our analysis. We show that there was no aggregate trend or periodicity in plague between
1400 and 1600 (Appendix D). We document that there were no non-linear increases in plagues
in more connected cities in the IV period. This indicates that the variation in the instrument
is not driven by a shift in plague towards locations that favor growth. We similarly show there
were no differential plague trends in cities that were more connected to trade networks (see
Appendix D). However, in our analysis we still control flexibly for long-run differences and
pre-trends in plague that could reflect unobserved city characteristics related to development.
Exclusion Restriction: Public Goods Institutions as the Channel
It is natural to wonder whether the plague shaped long-run outcomes directly, for example
through its demographic impact or through its influence on other political institutions.
Here we preview two pieces of evidence that that support the exclusion restriction. First,
we show that plagues in the early 1500s had a unique positive and statistically significant
relationship with long-run city growth when compared to plagues across the 1400s and later
1500s.58 Second, we find no relationship between plagues in the early 1500s and changes in
Reformation era and on the number of university students observed coming from each city decade-by-
decade, thus flexibly accounting for differences in the level and trend of human capital before plague shocks
and institutional change.
58Our results are further robust to relaxing the exclusion restriction to account for “plausible exogeneity”
(Conley, Hansen, and Rossi 2012), as we discuss below.
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Figure 8: City-Level Plague Outbreaks
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This graph shows the timing of major plague outbreaks in selected cities between 1400 and 1550. Source:
Biraben (1975). The vertical lines at 1500 and 1522 delimit the period used in our baseline instrumental
variable analysis to construct the early 1500s plague exposure instrument.
other city institutions. We present these analyses below in Section 6.3.
6.2 Instrumental Variable Estimates
For our instrumental variable design, we estimate the following first stage regression:
Lawi = c+ α· Plaguesi,1500−1522 + β · g(Plaguesi,1350−1499) + γ ·Xi +ǫi (5)
In our baseline specification, the instrument shifting public goods institutions is the number
of plague outbreaks between 1500 and 1522, the year the first church ordinance was passed.
Our instrument recovers how plagues that hit the generation in place when the Reformation
began shifted the probability of adoption. The impact of plagues across the early 1500s,
including through 1545, is similar and is discussed below. We control for long-run variation
in plague because over the long-run outbreaks may have been more frequent in cities that
were “open” or “good” and already bound to grow. To isolate plausibly exogenous variation
in outbreaks we control for: the average annual level of outbreaks 1350 to 1499 and,
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independently, the number of plague outbreaks each quarter-century starting in 1350. We
denote these controls with g(Plaguesi,1350−1499). The vector Xi contains the same control
variables as in Section 5, including our measure of upper tail human capital and the number
of university graduates over multiple pre-Reformation periods.59
Table 6 shows our IV results. In Panel A, column 1 shows that Plaguesi,1500−1522 is a
strong predictor for the adoption of a law and that each additional plague outbreak between
1500 and 1522 increases the propensity of adopting a law by 14 percentage points. The
F-statistic on the excluded instrument is above 34. In Panel B, the point estimate of the
second stage implies that a city with a law by 1600 was 1.61 log points larger in 1800
than a city without a law. We also find strong positive effects of adoption on both total
upper tail human capital and the intensity of upper tail human capital, measured by the
number of upper tail human capital individuals relative to total population. Our second
stage results are slightly stronger when we control for plague flexibly by period, accounting
for potential pre-trends (column 2). The results strengthen when we introduce region fixed
effects and identify off within-region variation (columns 3 and 4) and strengthen further
when we introduce principality fixed effects (columns 5 and 6).
To gauge the magnitudes of our IV estimates, we compare the implied annual growth
rates across our regression designs. The OLS estimates for upper tail human capital imply an
annual growth rate advantage of 0.1 percent for a treated city. The difference-in-differences
estimates imply an annual advantage of about 0.5 percent. The IV estimates imply an
annual growth advantage of approximately 1.1 percent. For city population, the OLS and IV
estimates imply annual growth rate advantages of 0.1 percent and 0.7 percent, respectively.60
There are several possible explanations for the fact that the IV estimates are much
larger than the OLS estimates. The first is that the IV isolates exogenous variation in
treatment whereas the OLS is attenuated by unobserved city characteristics. One might
assume that cities positively selected into treatment. However, there is little evidence that
the institutional change was adopted for directly economic reasons. In a few notable wealthy
59Our results are robust to also controlling for non-institutionalized Protestantism. As shown above,
Protestantism per se does not predict city growth or upper tail human capital.
60Note that our difference-in-difference estimates imply a total advantage of 1.2-1.9 log points in late 1700s
(Section 5). For comparison, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005b) study city growth and find that
European cities with access to Atlantic trade were 0.8-1.1 log points larger in 1800, controlling for time
invariant city characteristics and time fixed effects shared across cities.
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Table 6: Instrumental Variable Analysis of Long-Run Outcomes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Panel A: First Stage – Public Goods Institutions
Outcome: Adoption of Law
Plagues 1500-1522 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
R2 0.29 0.30 0.51 0.52 0.62 0.63
F Statistic on IV 34.02 32.69 18.92 31.42 8.70 12.02
Panel B: Instrumental Variable Outcomes – Population and Human Capital
Outcome: Ln Population in 1800
Law 1.61∗∗ 1.76∗∗ 1.94∗∗ 2.17∗∗ 2.13∗ 2.30∗∗
(0.82) (0.83) (0.98) (0.93) (1.12) (1.01)
Outcome: Ln Upper Tail Human Capital 1750-1799
Law 2.74∗∗ 2.96∗∗ 3.10∗∗ 3.34∗∗ 4.23∗∗ 4.54∗∗∗
(1.24) (1.29) (1.38) (1.40) (1.81) (1.28)
Outcome: Upper Tail Human Capital per 1,000
Law 0.56∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.59∗ 0.66∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.25) (0.31) (0.29) (0.40) (0.29)
Controls
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plagues Pre-1500: Level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plagues Pre-1500: Non-Linear No Yes No Yes No Yes
Region Fixed Effect (n=29) No No Yes Yes No No
Principality Fixed Effect (n=75) No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 239 239 239 239 234 234
The first stage outcome variable in Panel A is an indicator for the adoption of a church ordinance (Law).
“Plagues 1500-1522” is the number of plagues 1500 to 1522. The outcome variables in Panel B are: log
population in 1800; log of the number of upper tail human capital individuals observed between 1750 to
1799 plus one; and the number of upper tail human capital individuals per thousand population. In first
stage regressions, the dependent variable is an indicator for the passage of a Reformation ordinance by
1600. All regressions control separately for the log of upper tail human capital observed 1420-1469 and in
1470-1519, and include the complete set of controls from Table 5. Upper tail human capital is measured
by the sum of the number of migrants dying in a city-period and the number of people locally born people
reaching age forty in a city-period. Region fixed effects control use territories recorded by Nu¨ssli (2008).
Principality fixed effects use principalities recorded in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. “Plagues Pre-1500: Level”
is the average number of plagues from 1350 to 1499. “Plagues Pre-1500: Non-Linear” indicates independent
controls for the number of years with plague outbreaks in each of the twenty-five year periods: 1350-1374
through 1475-1499. Standard errors are clustered at the 1500 Region level. Statistical significance at the 90,
95, and 99 percent confidence level denoted “*”, “**”, and “***”.
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and well-connected cities, the municipal leadership was successful in preventing institutional
change. Cologne was Germany’s largest city in 1500 and is the classic example of a city in
which elites’ interest in preserving trade relationships motivated anti-Protestant behavior
(Scribner 1976). A second possibility is that the instrumental variable design recovers a
cleaner measure of the intensity of treatment. The adoption ordinances produced what
North (1990) would recognize as local “institutional matrices.” It is possible that the IV
captures underlying variation in institutions that is lost in the binary treatment variable on
which OLS relies. A third possibility is that the IV recovers underlying heterogeneity in the
returns to treatment across cities.
To examine whether the IV recovers heterogeneity in returns, we study whether the
interaction between plague shocks and city characteristics shaped the adoption of church
ordinances in Appendix D. We find no significant interaction between plagues and prior
printing, plagues and university students, or plagues and market rights. We do find evidence
that the plague effect on adoption was muted in free cities. This suggests that the effect of
plagues on adoption was concentrated in cities subject to feudal lords, where the barriers to
political change were higher.61 If cities subject to lords had higher returns to adoption, our
IV could recover these returns. However, we find no differential correlation between adoption
and growth in cities subject to lords (Appendix C).
6.3 Evidence Supporting the Exclusion Restriction
We use several tests to address the plausibility of the exclusion restriction. First, we test
whether plagues in general had a significant positive relationship with long-run population,
as would be predicted if they had direct growth effects. Second, we test for a relationship
between plague outbreaks in the 1500s and city-level institutional change along other
dimensions than the public goods institutions we study. Third, we test whether plagues in
the early 1500s drove increases in religious and political publications during the Reformation,
as we would expect if plague outbreaks in this period shifted political competition.
The relationship between plagues and long-run growth
Plagues could have influenced long run growth through channels not specific to the
61This is consistent with the finding in Dittmar and Seabold (2017) that variations in media market
competition mattered most for the diffusion of the Reformation ideas in cities subject to lords.
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political and institutional changes of the 1500s, for example by shifting the capital-to-labor
ratio and factor returns. Were this the case, we would expect to find that variation in plague
before, during, and after the early 1500s influenced long-run growth.
To test this possibility, we study the direct relationship between long-run city population
outcomes and plagues in different periods from the mid-1300s through the late-1500s. We
estimate regressions of the form:
ln(populationi1800) = α +
∑
t
βtplaguesit + γXi + ǫi (6)
The parameters of interest are the βt, which capture the relationship between long-run
population and plaguesit, which measures the number of plagues in city i in 25-year intervals
starting 1350-1374 and running to 1575-1599.62 The controls Xi include indicators for cities
with market rights by 1300, cities legally incorporated in 1300, region fixed effects, and initial
city population in 1300, measured categorically.
Table 7 shows that while early 1500s plagues predict city population in 1800, plagues
in other periods across the 1400s and 1500s do not. After the Black Death mega-shock
of the mid-1300s, the positive relationship between long-run population and plagues in the
early 1500s was unique in its magnitude, precision, and robustness.63 For example, while
plagues in the period 1475-1499 were also positively associated with long run outcomes, the
estimated relationship is imprecise and declines in magnitude when we control for initial
population in 1300 (column 2), city incorporation and market rights as of 1300 (column
3), and region fixed effects (column 4). In contrast, the relationship between early 1500s
plagues and long-run outcomes is robust to controlling for initial observables and studying
within-region variation.64
62We restrict to the period before 1600 because plagues in the 1600s largely reflected the military events
of the Thirty Years War and are thus highly correlated with other factors shaping development.
63We find no systematic changes in city-level institutions in the 1300s associated with differential exposure
to plagues in this era examining, for example, formal city incorporation, forms of city governance (Wahl
2017), and market rights (e.g. Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014). This suggests that the Black Death did not
shape variation in city-level outcomes through institutional channels, at least in Germany. It is consistent
with evidence showing that the Black Death raised growth through its effects on factor prices and consequent
changes in family structure, fertility, and human capital investments (as suggested by Voigtla¨nder and Voth
2013).
64We recognize that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the early 1500s and late 1400s estimates are the
same, due to the magnitude of the standard errors on the latter.
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Our results strongly suggest that long-run outcomes were not driven by the plague’s
direct economic impact, with the exception of the Black Death. Our key results are also
robust to relaxing the exclusion restriction. We find our results hold when we treat the
instrument as only “plausibly exogeneous” (Conley, Hansen, and Rossi 2012), as shown
in Appendix D. Our estimates are also consistent with historical evidence indicating that
plagues had long-run development impacts precisely when outbreaks occurred in critical
junctures (Biraben 1975). While political competition extended until the mid-1500s, and we
observe no significant relationship between plagues 1525-1549 and long-run growth, this is
conditional on variation in plagues in other periods including 1500-1524. For cities that were
not early adopters of institutional change, plagues in the period 1525-1549 remained highly
significant predictors of institutional change and growth, as we show below.
Plagues in the early 1500s did not shift other institutions
Did plagues in the early 1500s, which had a special relationship to long-run growth,
drive other institutional changes that could explain our findings? Changes in political
institutions occurred in some cities in the 1500s, including in institutions securing more
participatory governance (Wahl 2016). More participatory political institutions could be
expected to promote growth, and are the most likely alternative growth channel to the public
goods institutions we investigate. In the 1500s, we observe changes in political institutions
that established or eliminated: (1) participatory elections; (2) public representation on city
assemblies; and (3) municipal constitutions that secured representation for guilds on city
councils (Whaley 2012; Brady 2009; Wahl 2016).
We test whether plagues in the 1500s drove changes in these political institutions,
using data from Wahl (2016; 2017) and the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. We estimate models
that are structurally identical to the first stage in our IV analysis examining public goods
institutions. Table 8 presents our estimates and shows there was no significant relationship
between plague shocks and changes in political institutions on any of these dimensions. This
result holds when we examine all the variation in the data and when we study within-
region variation (odd and even columns, respectively).65 There is similarly no significant
65In Table 8 we examine shifts towards and away from “participative political institutions”: the outcome
variables take values +1 when elections, representation, or a guild constitution are established; 0 when no
institutional change is observed; and -1 when elections, representation, or a guild constitution are eliminated.
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Table 7: Historic Plague Outbreaks and City Population in 1800
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Outcome: Ln Population in 1800
Plagues 1350-1374 0.42∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Plagues 1375-1399 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.12
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15)
Plagues 1400-1324 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06
(0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.26)
Plagues 1425-1449 0.11 0.13 0.16∗ 0.13
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Plagues 1450-1474 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Plagues 1475-1499 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.10
(0.23) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
Plagues 1500-1524 0.19∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.22∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Plagues 1525-1549 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Plagues 1550-1574 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.08
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
Plagues 1575-1599 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Observations 239 239 239 239
Population in 1300 No Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effects No No No Yes
This table presents results from regressions estimating the relationship between city population in 1800 and
historic plague exposure between 1350 and 1599. “Plagues 1350-1374” is the count of plague outbreaks in that
period. Other plague variables are similarly defined. Controls include indicators for city incorporation and for
city market rights granted by 1300. Population fixed effects are for categorical variables: population in 1300
data missing; 1,000-5,000; 6,000-10,000; 11,000-20,000; and more than 20,000. Region fixed effects control
for regions from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. Standard errors are clustered at the region level. Statistical
significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level denoted “*”, “**”, and “***”.
relationship between plagues and institutional change when we separately estimate for (i)
cities without participative institutions in 1500, i.e. candidates for adoption, and (ii) cities
with participative institutions in 1500, i.e. candidates for disestablishment.66
The fact that plagues did not shift participatory institutions is to be expected, given that
reformers supported local secular power structures and targeted the Catholic Church as a
66Between 1500 and 1600, changes in “Participatory Elections,” “Public Representation,” and “Guild
Constitution” are observed in 11, 25, and 24 of the 239 cities in our data, respectively. In 1500, 61 cities in
our data had participative elections, 76 had public representation, and 80 had guild constitutions. Separate
estimates for adoption candidates and disestablishment candidates are available on request.
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foreign, rent-seeking organization (Hamm 1994; Blickle 1994; Ozment 1975).
Table 8: Plagues and Other Potential Institutional Changes in the 1500s
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Outcome: Change in Institutions in the 1500s
Participatory Public Guild
Elections Representation Constitution
Plagues 1500-1522 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.07 -0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 239 239 239 239 239 239
This table presents results from regressions estimating the relationship between plague shocks and
institutional change in the 1500s. We examine changes in formal institutions establishing or eliminating:
(1) participatory elections; (2) public representation, specifically formal representative bodies for citizens
(Burghers); and (3) constitutions securing guild representation on city councils. The outcome measures
of institutional change are constructed from data in Wahl (2016; 2017) and the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch.
Institutional change outcomes take values of: 1 when institutional indices go from 0 in 1500 to 1 in 1600; 0
when institutional indices do not change between 1500 and 1600; and -1 when institutional indices go from 1
in 1500 to 0 in 1600. Specifications and the complete set of controls match the first stage regression estimates
reported in Table 6. Standard errors are clustered by region.
Increased Religious and Political Competition After Plague Shocks
An additional prediction of our analysis is that plague shocks led to increases in religious
and political competition. We use data on religious and political publications across cities
as proxies for competition, and examine the relationship between plagues and publications
in Table 9. Our data measure the number of religious publications and political publications
in a given city-year.67 We find religious and political publication increased significantly
in response to plague shocks in the early 1500s. This result is not driven by a decline
in publications during plague outbreaks and mean reversion afterwards, as we show by (i)
examining only plagues between 1510 and 1521 and (ii) dropping the years 1510-1521 from
our analysis in Appendix D. Our results reflect both increases in religious and political
publications in cities that had printing prior to 1517 and increases in cities that did not
have printing prior to 1517, but where printers subsequently settled.68 Significantly, over
67Over 95% of religious publications were not bibles. We identify religious publications, political tracts,
and discourses on government using the classification in the Universal Short Title Catalogue.
68When we restrict the sample to only cities without any printing before 1517, we find that plague shocks
drove highly significant increases in religious publications in the post period. Narrative evidence on cities
without any printing suggests a similar chronological pattern, with political competition increasing sharply
in the 1520s, especially where legal changes later occurred (Scribner 1979).
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the early 1500s printing activity in cities that subsequently did and did not adopt public
goods institutions was similar (Figures 1 and 2 above). We thus study a different form of
variation from Dittmar (2011), which examines the relationship between pre-1500 printing
and subsequent economic development.
Table 9: Plagues and Religious and Political Publications
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Religious Publications Political Publications
Post × Plagues 1500-1522 2.03∗∗∗ 2.04∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
Region × Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 24139 24139 24139 24139
Mean Outcome 1.46 1.46 0.04 0.04
This table presents regression estimates examining the relationship between plagues and religious and
political publishing outcomes. The outcome is the number of religious or political publications in a given city-
year. Data on religious and political publications are from the Universal Short Title Catalogue. The analysis
examines printing across cities from 1500 through 1600. “Post× Plagues 1500-1522” is an interaction between
an indicator for the post-1517 period (“Post”) and the number of plagues in the early 1500s (Plagues 1500-
1522). Standard errors are clustered by city. Statistical significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence
level denoted “*”, “**”, and “***”.
6.4 Plagues, Institutional Change, and Growth Across the 1500s
Our baseline analysis relies on variation in plague in the early 1500s. In this section, we
show our results are robust when we study plagues across the first half of the 1500s.
We define the instrument time period in our baseline analysis to ensure we do not reverse
the direction of causation and to eliminate measurement error. While reverse causation
is unlikely, one could for example wonder whether the risk of plague outbreaks might
have increased with rising in-migration – as an unintended result of institutional change.
Measurement error could arise due to the staggered timing of plague outbreaks and the
adoption of church ordinances. By the mid-1500s, cities had been exposed to early plague
shocks and, partly in response, many had already adopted. When we study the impact
of plagues after 1522, the control group for whom the instrument is “off” in later periods
contains cities that appear as “always takers” by virtue of previously being exposed to plagues
and adopting. We might thus expect potential bias in estimates using post-1522 plagues as
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the IV. Our baseline set-up rules out these forms of reverse causality and measurement error.
While our baseline rules out reverse causality and measurement error, it excludes from
consideration plagues in the 1520s and 1530s that may have influenced the adoption of
ordinances in cities that were not early adopters. Consider the example of the city of
Hannover which had no plagues from 1500 to 1522, meaning the IV is “turned off” in our
baseline analysis. Hannover survived without a law into the 1530s, experienced a plague in
1535, and adopted an ordinance in 1536. This example invites us to ask whether plagues
across the first half of the 1500s operated similarly.
In the data, we find that our results are robust to examining plagues across the first half
of the 1500s. In Table 10, columns 1 and 2 present our baseline results using plagues between
1500 and 1522 as the IV, with and without region fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 present
our estimates using plagues across the first half of the 1500s as the IV (for comparability
with the baseline, we normalize to consider plagues on a consistent per-23-year basis). The
IV estimates are broadly similar across specifications.
Table 10: IV Estimates Using Plague Shocks in Different Time Periods
[1] [2] [3] [4]
IV Outcome: Ln Population in 1800
Law 1.76∗∗ 2.17∗∗ 1.33∗ 1.96∗∗
(0.83) (0.93) (0.77) (0.81)
F Statistic on IV 32.69 31.42 31.94 28.10
First Stage Outcome: Law
Plagues 1500-1522 0.13∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Plagues 1500-1550 0.19∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Observations 239 239 239 239
Region Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
This table presents IV regression estimates. Columns 1 and 2 present our baseline estimates using plague
1500-1522 as the IV. Columns 3 and 4 present corresponding estimates using plague 1500-1550 as the IV.
For the period 1500-1550, we normalize the count of plagues to a 23 year basis to ensure comparability of the
first stage estimates (i.e. for Plagues 1500-1550 we divide the observed number of plagues by 51 and multiply
by 23). Regression specifications and controls correspond to Table 6 column 2 (without region fixed effects)
and column 4 (with region fixed effects). Standard errors are clustered by region. Statistical significance at
the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level denoted “*”, “**”, and “***”.
Our results are further supported by another set of comparisons: how the plague
instrument shifted adoption and growth year-by-year in the subset of cities that had not
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adopted up to that point. We thus compare plagues, adoption, and growth in the set
of cities that survived as candidates for adoption in any given year. We find that the first
stage relationship between recent plagues and institutional change initially strengthened after
1522 and that the relationship between induced institutional change and growth remained
relatively stable over the first half of the 1500s. This analysis comparing the effects of the
instrument as it gets “turned on” at different times for different cities provides an additional
external validity check on our baseline estimates and is presented in Appendix D.
7 Conclusion
Public goods may be under-provided by private markets and entrenched political interests.
A large literature studies how democratic voting or military competition may promote the
provision of public goods. In contrast, we focus on citizen-led, quasi-revolutionary political
action. This action occurred when the introduction of religious competition during the
Protestant Reformation transformed the political landscape, resulting in expansions of public
goods provision in non-democratic settings. The expansion of public goods provision fostered
human capital accumulation and ultimately led to long-run growth.
Our research shows how the introduction of religious competition precipitated profound
changes in the role of the state. The Reformation interacted with local political economy,
leading to the expansion of public goods provision. This expansion of public goods – and
not the adoption of Protestantism – had unintended positive consequences for growth.
While the Reformation was a unique event, our results are general. To be sustained,
expanded public goods provision must be a political and institutional equilibrium. We
provide evidence on canonical changes in public goods institutions, including expansions of
social welfare provision and the establishment of public education. Critically, the state
expanded public education in order to produce the skilled administrators it needed to
efficiently provide a broad set of public goods. Our findings thus indicate how institutions
and human capital inputs directed to public goods provision are mutually self-reinforcing.
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